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 Section 1-102 (2)(c)1
 By 196_, the Code had been adopted in 49 states and the District of Columbia.  The only exception to formal2
uniformity was Louisiana, where adoption of most parts of the Code has occurred more recently.
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RETHINKING THE UNIFORMITY NORM IN COMMERCIAL LAW
Optimal Institutional Design for Regulating Incomplete Contracts 
Robert E. Scott*
Introduction
One of the central norms of the Uniform Commercial Code is “to make uniform the law
among the various jurisdictions.”   Nowhere in the Code, however, is the substance of the 1
uniformity norm of commercial law explained or justified.  Moreover, in the thirty years following
the widespread adoption of the Code in all American jurisdictions , there has been virtually no2
academic or judicial analysis of whether this grand experiment in the uniform codification of
American commercial law has, in fact, produced the social benefits that are presumed to follow
from uniformity.  Instead, there is a broad consensus, uninformed by evidence or analysis, that
formal uniformity has led to substantive uniformity, to the certainty, predictability  and stability
that are the bedrock desiderata of commercial law.
This uncritical acceptance of the notion that uniform codification best promotes
substantive uniformity is puzzling.  Large areas of commercial contract law and corporate law
remain outside the Code and have evolved in a formally non-uniform fashion through the process
of common law adjudication and statutory enactments in various states.  In the case of corporate
charters, a robust literature has focused on the substantive benefits inherent in jurisdictional 
diversity--stimulating a “race to the top” as states compete among themselves to capture the
See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product; Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.  Law, Econ. &3
Org. 224 (1985); William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 715 (1998);  Roberta
Romano, the Genius of American Corporate Law (1993); Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete?: The Case for
a Competitive Corporate Law Market, 36 McGill L.J. 130 (1993).
Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or “the4
Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 Va. L. Rev. 713 (1997).
For the same reason, textualists in other areas of law, like statutory interpretation, argue against using context5
evidence such as legislative history to illuminate the text.
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economic rents from incorporation.   Many of these substantive benefits, such as predictable3
interpretation of corporate charters and the promulgation of standardized contract terms, are
precisely the values that inhere in any sensible conception of what the uniformity norm entails.4
Clearly, then, uniform codification is not the only institutional design for promoting 
substantive uniformity.  Nor is it a priori preferable or superior to the common law alternative. 
The experience of the last forty years does provide us the opportunity to conduct a natural
experiment: to compare the uniform code and the common law against plausible optimality
criteria that undergird the norm of uniformity.  This essay begins that project. 
 I begin with the claim that the state’s primary substantive role in uniformly enforcing
commercial contracts is to regulate incomplete contracts efficiently.  This role requires the state to
perform two interdependent but conceptually distinct functions.  The first is an interpretive
function--the task of correctly (and uniformly) interpreting the meaning of the contract terms
chosen by the parties to allocate contract risk.  The second is a standardizing function--the task of
creating broadly suitable default rules and/or “labeling” widely used contract terms (or
combinations of terms) with standard meanings.  Correct interpretation argues for a “textualist”
or plain meaning interpretation of the express terms used in incomplete contracts.   The task of5
generating useful defaults argues, on the other hand, for contextualizing incomplete contracts. 
The defaults will naturally come from commercial practice, and context evidence is the way courts
find out about commercial practice. Thus, the first goal seems to require keeping context out
See UCC Section 1-102(3).  An “agreement” means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their6
language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
performance...”  Comment 3 explains that the Code’s concept of agreement is intended to include full recognition of all
context evidence and the surrounding circumstances.
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whenever possible, and the second goal seems to require incorporating context as often as
possible.  As a consequence, the law is apparently forced to trade off one goal against the other. 
 The UCC has quite clearly chosen the strategy of incorporation.  In addition to a broad
definition of the meaning of a legally binding agreement , it adopts a pervasive standard of6
commercial reasonableness that requires context to supply meaning to many of its generic default
rules. But curiously, the Code fails even at the one task it was explicitly designed to do.  Under
the Code, there has been very little production of standardized defaults.  Moreover, the Code,
intent on incorporation, fails at the first enterprise--reliable and predictable interpretation of
contractual text.  On the other hand, the development of standardized defaults has been much
more successful under the common law, in those areas of contract law such as commercial
services to which the Code does not extend.  And these courts have also retained more traditional
plain meaning and parol evidence rules and thus have maintained and  reinforced their textualist
interpretive strategy.  The result is that both kinds of efficiency gains--the creation of a fairly
uniform menu of standardized defaults, with regular additions of new terms to the menu, and
stable (i.e., uniform) interpretation of express terms-- are seen much more in the common law
than under the Code.  
In sum, the great exercise in promoting codified uniformity and predictability has instead
produced variety and greater contracting risk.  In part, this is a problem caused by the way in
which the Code is drafted and especially with the pervasive emphasis on commercial
reasonableness.  But in a larger sense, the inefficiencies of the Code are a product of the
codification enterprise itself --of trying to introduce a civil-law approach into a largely successful
common law system.  A code remains at all times its own best evidence of what it means.  Thus,
decisions interpreting specific contract terms and default rules of the Code do not as easily
For a discussion of what it means to call the UCC a “true” code, see note 60 infra.7
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become part of the understood, standardized meaning.  Because gaps are filled with reference to
the internal policy of the Code rather than the external contractual context, interpretation is both
contextual and self-referential--the worst of both worlds.7
The paper proceeds as follows.  Part I specifies the efficiency objectives of a uniform
commercial law.  Part II compares the experience of contracting parties under the Code (with
particular emphasis on sales law ) with the roughly parallel experience of commercial parties who
negotiate and litigate contracts under the common law.  I evaluate the results of this natural
experiment in terms of the uniformity criteria developed in Part I.  Surprisingly, uniform
codification appears to be an inferior institutional design to the modern common law alternative. 
In Part III, I argue that a principal  reason why the UCC is less “uniform” than the common law
stems from the uniquely different interpretive methodology and institutional design that is dictated
by a code.  Thus, while the Code has achieved a formal jurisdictional uniformity it has failed to
enhance substantive uniformity: the Code forces a contextualist interpretation of express terms in
incomplete contracts, but it does so without securing the offsetting benefits of standardization. 
  This principle is vividly captured in Judge Learned Hand’s famous dictum:8
“A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the
parties...If it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the words, intended something else
than the usual meaning which the law imposes upon them, he would still be held....” 
Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, 201 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff’d, 231 U.S.
50 (1913).  See also, the court’s statement in Chernohorsky v Northern Liquid Gas Co:
“The language of a contract must be understood to mean what it clearly expresses.  A court may not depart
from the plain meaning of a contract where it is free from ambiguity.  In construing the terms of a contract,
where the terms are plain and unambiguous, it is the duty of the court to construe it as it stands, even though the
parties may have placed a different construction on it.” 
Chernohorsky v. Northern Liquid Gas Co., 268 Wis. 586, 68 N.W. 2d 429 (1955); Restatement of Contracts sec. 230
comment b (1932); 4 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts,  Sec. 609, at 403-04 n.2 (citing supporting
cases). 
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I.  THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN UNIFORMLY REGULATING INCOMPLETE  
CONTRACTS
The central task of a uniform commercial law is to specify the appropriate role of the state
in regulating incomplete contracts.  Complete contracts are rarely, if ever, breached since the pay-
offs for every relevant action and the corresponding sanctions for non performance are prescribed. 
In the case of incomplete contracts, parties have incentives to breach to exploit contractual gaps.
Making the verifiable terms of the contract legally enforceable and regulating incompleteness in a
consistent manner reduces these incentives to breach.  Legal enforcement of incomplete contracts
thus requires the state to interpret the signals the contracting parties have used to allocate
contractual risk.  Interpreting disputed contracts also presents the state with the opportunity to
protect (and even improve) the efficacy of those signals for future contractors.  If the state
performs this function in an inconsistent manner the costs of contracting will rise.
The Efficiency Values of Uniformity
To regulate incomplete contracts efficiently, the state must consistently or “uniformly”
perform two interdependent but conceptually distinct functions.  The first is an interpretive
function--the task of uniformly interpreting the contract terms chosen by contracting parties to
allocate contract risk.  An interpretation is ‘uniform’ when it is transparent to the litigating parties
and predictable to other parties.  An important point, often lost on those who promote formal8
7
uniformity, is that uniform interpretation is both a temporal as well as a jurisdictional matter. 
Thus, one efficiency value is for parties to know at the time they write contracts that their
verifiable obligations will be interpreted in the same manner by courts of different jurisdictions
(jurisdictional uniformity).  In addition, efficiency is enhanced if parties are certain that courts in
any given jurisdiction will interpret their verifiable obligations uniformly over time (temporal
uniformity).
  The interpretive task is made difficult in incomplete contracts because the causes of
incompleteness are not known to the interpreter.  Did the parties fail to complete the contract
deliberately or inadvertently?  Is the incompleteness a product of high transaction costs or of
endogenous factors?  If the incompleteness is a result of endogenous factors, those factors may be
the inability of the parties who can observe relevant variables to verify those variables to courts or
they may be the unwillingness of the parties to disclose to others the relevant information
necessary to verification.  For these reasons, an interpreter seeking to understand the causes of
incompleteness in any particular case can only sensibly rely on the signals chosen by the parties. 
Predictability of meaning is the bedrock of any signaling system.  This latter requirement argues
for the use of objective interpretive methodologies so that parties can predict over time the effect
to be given to the words used to create obligations.  Thus, objective modes of interpretation and
temporal uniformity go hand-in-hand.
The second function of uniform state regulation is standardization.  At least to the extent
that this task is also performed by courts, it is interdependent with and derivative of the
interpretive function.  The state facilitates the contracting process to the extent that courts in the
process of interpretation create standardized (or ‘uniform’) terms that parties can use in signaling
their intentions so as to remove the uncertainties attendant on interpretation.  Those signals can be
developed in two ways.  The first is through a process of “gap filling”, where courts interpreting
incomplete contracts elect to condition or qualify the express terms of the contract by specifying
default rules that complete the contract.  These default rules can be broadly suitable 
8
“majoritarian” defaults that apply to the largest set of heterogenous contractors, or they can be
“tailored” defaults that apply to smaller subsets of homogeneous parties (such as merchants in a
particular trade or business).  The second method of standardization occurs when courts interpret
authoritatively the meaning of widely used express terms (“invocations”) or combinations of
express terms (“conventions”) in incomplete contracts.  In either case, the key to this process is
the standardization of the meaning and jurisdiction of the relevant defaults and of the menu of 
express invocations or conventions from which parties can customize their contracts. 
As a matter of institutional design, these two functions can be performed separately--e.g.,
where courts interpret incomplete contracts and legislators generate useful defaults and menus of
invocations or conventions-- or they can be performed in combination --e.g., where courts fill
gaps and interpret litigated contracts and thereby attach standard meanings to defaults,
invocations and conventions.  But in either case, the performance of the one role necessarily
effects the performance of the other.  Evaluating these efficiency objectives of state regulation is
further complicated in American law because, as I suggested above, there are two quite different
dimensions of nonuniformity.  The first dimension is principally temporal.  It assumes a single
state decision maker and looks to consistency and standardization over time.  A quite different
dimension of the problem is embodied in jurisdictional uniformity, which focusses on consistent
decision making by different courts in different jurisdictions.  For expository clarity, I will
designate both dimensions as comprising  “substantive” uniformity.  Substantive uniformity should
be distinguished from purely formal uniformity, e.g., the coincidence of similar rules across time
and across jurisdictions.
While the complexity of the task of uniformly regulating incomplete contracts is better
understood today, policy makers have long seen the critical importance of predictability of
outcomes and certainty of meaning given to both the express and implied terms in commercial
law.  Indeed, perhaps the oldest aphorism in commercial law is that in commercial contexts it is
more important for the law to be certain than to be right.  This aphorism has its roots in the law
Hall, The Common Law: An Account of its Reception in the United States, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 791 (1951).9
 Gilmore, Commercial Law in the United States: Its Codification and Other Misadventures, in Aspects of10
Comparative Commercial Law:  Sales, Consumer Credit, and Secured Transactions 449, 454 (J. Ziegel & W. Foster
1969)
See, e.g., Committee on Commercial Law, Report, 10 ABA Rep. 332, 332-44 (1887); See generally, Taylor,11
Federalism or Uniformity of Commercial Law, 11 Rutgers-Camden Law Journal, 527 (1980).
Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1892).12
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merchant and found new voice in the United States where commercial law was first established in
the diversity of different states accepting the English Common Law at different times and with
different interpretations of the content and meaning of that law.  9
 The Uniformity Movement in Commercial Law
Despite the diversity of jurisdiction and legal heritage in the United States, a recognizable
trend toward uniformity in commercial law quickly took hold.  Grant Gilmore observed the effects
of Swift v. Tyson on commercial law in the nineteenth century:
During the second half of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court of the United States
became a great commercial court. The rules which it announced were, in nine cases out of
ten, gladly followed by the state courts as well as, of course, by the lower federal courts. 
A remarkable degree of national uniformity in the law applicable to commercial
transactions was in fact achieved over a remarkably long period of time.   Nevertheless,10
the degree of uniformity achieved by this ‘common law’ process was seen as inadequate. 
Significant diversity in the commercial law of various states led to calls for the enactment
of a federal commercial code to govern interstate commercial transactions.11
 The calls for a federal code stimulated the formation of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1892.   Rather than accepting federal intrusions into a12
traditional preserve of state authority, the National Conference proposed to formulate and seek
adoption of various uniform laws governing different aspects of commercial law.  Each state was
 See generally, Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 Va. L. Rev. 558 (1940); Thomas, The Federal13
Sales Bill as Viewed by the Merchant and the Practitioner, 26 Va. L. Rev. 537 (1940).
 See note 60 infra for a discussion of the status of the Code as a “code”.14
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then encouraged to adopt these uniform statutes.  Unhappily for the Conference, the uniform acts
received a mixed reception in the states.  All states adopted the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law and the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act.  But only thirty states adopted the Uniform Sales
Act and only ten enacted the Uniform Conditional Sales Act.
The result of the first efforts to produce uniform state commercial law was seen as
unsuccessful in terms of the key criteria of predictability of interpretation and standardization of
legal rules.  Widely noted were the prevalence of local amendments to uniform acts and
interpretational differences among the various state courts.  The perceived failure of the states’
processes to perform adequately the substantive purposes underlying the drive for uniformity
stimulated reform initiatives.  In 1940, the Federal Sales Act was introduced in Congress.  The
federal act received strong support from influential academics and practitioners.   The National13
Commissioners reacted to the threat of federalization with predictable speed.  They lobbied
against federal enactment, began the drafting of a revised Uniform Sales Act and, perhaps most
significantly, recruited to their task, Karl Llewellyn, one of the strongest advocates for the
federalization of sales law. 
By 1945, the NCCUSL had formed a collaboration with the American Law Institute and ,
working in tandem, they expanded the revised sales act project to include the drafting of a
comprehensive Uniform Commercial Code.  Llewellyn and the other proponents of the project
sought to avoid the difficulties with the previous experiment in state law uniformity by creating a
‘code’ in a true sense -- a systematic, preemptive and comprehensive enactment of a whole field
of law.   The decision to produce a code was primarily instrumental.  The ALI and NCCUSL14
believed that this consolidation would enable them to sell the entire project to the states on a
“take it or leave it” basis and thus avoid the selective enactment that had occurred with the earlier
  William D. Hawkland, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Civil Code, 56 La. L. Rev. 231, 232-3515
(1995).
By 1975, Louisiana had enacted Articles 1,3,4 and 5.  Subsequently, Article 9 and parts of Article 2 were16
enacted as well.
 Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions17
Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 261, 262 (1985).   
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uniform acts.   The strategy worked.  By 1967, every American state except Louisiana had15
adopted the Code.16
In a formal sense, uniformity in commercial law has been achieved.  But the success of the
Code in gaining widespread and “uniform” adoption has disguised a deeper jurisprudential
question.  To what extent have the efficiency goals of uniformity--predictability of interpretation
and standardization of widely useful terms-- been served by the experiment in codification of
commercial law?  Before we can address that question systematically, we must first examine more
carefully the interdependencies that affect those two central roles of state regulation.
The Dilemma of Substantive Uniformity
The traditional assumption that uniform law straightforwardly promotes the efficient
regulation of incomplete contracting is, at best, simplistic and, at worst, seriously misleading.  To
the extent that the uniformity norm purports to embrace both predictable interpretations of
incomplete contracts as well as the standardization of contract terms, it is subject to an apparent
dilemma: achieving predictability in interpretation appears to undercut the process of
standardization and vice versa.  This dilemma is rooted in the fundamental tensions that exist
between express terms and default rules and between standard and unconventional forms of
expression.
 
 To the extent that these tensions have been understood at all, the major attempt to
harmonize them relies on what I have elsewhere termed the expanded choice postulate.   The17
postulate maintains that default rules (as well as menus of contract terms) expand contractors
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choices by providing standardized and widely suitable contract terms that reduce the cost and
error involved in individually negotiating a complete contract.  This expanded choice thesis
implicitly presumes a neutral stance toward individualized agreements:  atypical parties lose
nothing, since they remain free to opt out of the standard defaults and/or design customized
provisions to replace the state sanctioned terms.
But the seductive appeal of the expanded choice postulate serves to disguise its
unacknowledged incongruities.  For example, creating useful defaults by filling gaps in incomplete
contracts may lead to misinterpretation of the express terms of the contract.  On the other hand,
strict adherence to a textualist or plain meaning interpretation of the express terms in an
incomplete contract may diminish the supply of useful defaults that will have received official
“recognition”.  These and other related problems expose a central question that challenges the
simple form of the uniformity norm:  to what extent do express terms and default rules, and
standardized and individualized forms of agreement function in antagonistic rather than
complementary ways? 
The Benefits of Standardization.  Standardized terms exist both as default rules and as
standard terms and forms (express invocations and conventions).  The state’s provision of
standardized defaults, invocations and conventions reduces many errors that inhere in incomplete
contracting.  Providing a menu of signals from which parties can choose greatly simplifies and
reduces the cost of contracting.  It is important to realize, however, that the benefits of
standardization go far beyond a mere savings of these additional resource costs.  Standardized
terms bring a collective wisdom and experience that parties are unable to generate individually.
  The unique benefits of standardization derive from the process by which such terms
mature and are recognized by the state as having consistent meaning.  A principal effect of this
evolutionary process is the testing of combinations of express terms and default rules for latent
defects.  Combinations of terms in incomplete contracts are unlikely to be carefully pretested by
See Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice, supra note -- at---.18
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individual contractors; testing involves substantial risks and private parties who develop
successful packages of contractual terms cannot capture much of the benefit that will accrue to
subsequent users.  Thus, the state’s recognition of the evolutionary trial and error process
functions as a regulatory scheme designed to promote these public goods.  Over time, the
consequences of standard formulations are observable in a wide range of transactions, permitting
the identification and removal of errors of ambiguity, inconsistency or incompleteness.18
  Standardization thus provides a reliable and uniform (and therefore intelligible) system of
signaling to courts the nature of the contractual risk assumed by each party.  It also contributes to
the evolutionary enrichment of the supply of novel terms through the selection and announcement
of specific experiences that can be generalized to particular classes of transactions.  By expanding
the stock of such tailored defaults, the state provides parties with better fitting default choices. 
Taken in combination, these several benefits argue for more rather than less standardization. 
However, the gains from standardization are purchased at considerable cost.  First, 
standardization increases the risk that courts will misinterpret the meaning of the express terms
that parties use to opt out of the standard defaults.  Second, standardized defaults increase the
difficulty in coordinating a move to novel default terms.  The first problem undermines the
objective of predictable interpretation while the second threatens the future supply of useful
default terms.
Institutional Bias Against Verifiable Express Terms.  Interpretation of incomplete
contracts by courts is the traditional medium through which the state incorporates privately
developed prototypes into the stock of useful default rules.  The evolution of widely useful
standardized terms is facilitated by theories of interpretation that use context evidence liberally to
supplement both the express terms of an agreement and the state-supplied default rules.  This
objective clashes, however, with the demands of the second interpretive function: correctly
See Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 833 (1964).19
  The costs of innovation include the uncertainty costs of interpretation.  New terms, no matter how apt for the20
parties contracting purposes, carry an enhanced risk that they will be interpreted by courts in a manner different from
that intended by the parties.  Novel terms also carry a heightened risk of latent ambiguity and other errors of expression. 
These costs are borne by the initial drafters and remain until the terms have survived litigation and been  
14
interpreting the verifiable express terms in incomplete contracts.  Are these verifiable terms to be
interpreted as trumping the default rules and thus given a plain meaning interpretation “as
written”?  Or are they seen as merely supplementing the defaults and thus to be contingent on 
default terms that courts deploy to complete the gaps in the contract? 
 A single-minded focus on increasing the supply of standardized defaults will threaten the
integrity of the express terms in the contract because the interpreter will be reluctant to give
express terms meanings that conflict with the apparent factual and legal context.  One response is
for courts to insist --through the rules of interpretation--on certain standards of artful wording.  19
The bias against interpreting verifiable express terms “as written” (i.e., without recourse to
context evidence) will tend to diminish if key words are given well-defined meanings.  This means
of protecting the building blocks of express agreement requires the interpreter to restrict the
weight accorded to any extrinsic evidence that vitiates the predefined or “plain” meaning of
certain terms.
 
Barriers to Innovation.  Even assuming that parties can define contract terms so as to
escape the standard formulations, standardization impedes the development of novel or innovative
terms.  A transition to new contractual formulations requires groups of contractors to coordinate
their joint adoption of a standard formulation of the novel terms.  The limits of copyright law
create an initial barrier to innovation by denying parties substantial property rights in their
formulations.  An inherent collective action problem thus retards the production of novel terms
for emerging relationships.  So long as individual contractors must bear the costs of novelty but 
are incapable of capturing the full benefits of their innovative expressions, novel formulations will
be underproduced.   Moreover, learning effects (the costs involved in learning how best to use20
“authoritatively” interpreted.  See Goetz & Scott, Expanded Choice, supra note ---at ---.
 See Steven Walt, Novelty and the Risks of Uniform Sales Law  (1998).21
 See also Eric Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual22
Interpretation, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 533 (1998) (framing this dilemma as a choice between a “hard parol evidence rule”
and a “soft parol evidence rule”)
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and deploy the novel terms) will discourage parties from adopting the novel terms once they are
developed.   Thus, even if private parties could costlessly develop novel uniform terms, they21
cannot readily coordinate any general move to the new forms by other contractors.  
The twin problems of misinterpretation and uncoordinated behavior that are a by-product
of the state’s effort to provide uniform and standardized terms are a classic illustration of the
optimal solution for one segment of a multidimensional problem being inconsistent with the
optimal solution for the whole.  Standardization, which aims to reduce the costs of contracting,
indirectly produces negative effects in a related dimension of the regulatory process.  This fact
does not, of course, imply that the state’s role in facilitating standardized terms is on balance
undesirable.  It does suggest, however, that the drive toward uniformity in American commercial
law has ignored significant trade-offs in the state’s regulatory process.   Understanding how best22
to optimize these trade-offs requires a better understanding of contacting behavior.  What are the
causes of incompleteness in contracts, and how best can the state assist parties as it performs the
dual roles of interpretation and standardization?
 Maximizing Solutions to the Uniformity Dilemma
Assuming that substantive uniformity is a desirable objective for the state, a  plausible
strategy is to maximize the net social benefits to contracting parties that derive from the dual
regulatory functions of  interpretation and standardization.  But operationalizing this formulation
poses significant difficulties.  Even assuming that the gains to contractors from “better”
interpretation of incomplete contracts can be compared ordinally to the gains to parties from
increased standardization, the question remains: how best to strike the balance?  And can some
 See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation principle:23
Some Notes on a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 554 (1977).
 See Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089 (1981).24
 Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. Cal. Interdisciplinary L. J.25
389 (1994)
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types of institutional design achieve that optimum better than others?
The recent theoretical literature on incomplete contracting offers some valuable insights
into the reasons for incompleteness and, in turn, suggests a modest and circumscribed role for
courts in generating default rules and an expansive role in “recognizing” standardized express
terms.
  There are, broadly speaking, two classes of reasons why parties might not write complete 
contracts (contracts that prescribe pay-off relevant actions for every possible state of the world)--
transactions costs and asymmetric information.  Transactions costs explanations of
incompleteness have formed the basis for much of the law-and-economics analysis of contract
law.  On this account, parties write incomplete contracts because:  a) the resource costs to them
of writing complete contingent contracts would either exceed their  gains or the costs to the state
of creating  useful defaults;  or b) the parties are unable to identify and foresee uncertain future23
conditions or are incapable of characterizing complex adaptations adequately.24
If transactions costs are preventing the parties from completing contracts with efficient
terms, then the state properly should supply defaults to solve those problems when the state’s 
costs are lower than the parties.  Much of the recent contract theory literature argues, however, 
that these conditions are hard to satisfy in a large economy with heterogenous parties.   Under25
these conditions, many factors suggest a modest state role--the more heterogenous are the
contracting parties, the less the scale economies for any default and the greater the likelihood that
the state is less capable than the parties themselves in solving their contracting problems.  Unless
 Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and Law (1997); Ian26
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L. J. 729
(1992); Hermalin and Katz, Judicial Modification of Contracts between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View
of Incomplete Contracts and their Breach, 9 J. Law Econ & Org. 98 (1993).
 Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, supra note--- at ----.27
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the contracting solution is immanent in the commercial practice and relationship of the parties (as
Llewellyn believed it was), and a court can identify and standardize the practice or experience as a
default, a court is likely to create ill-fitting defaults in complex commercial environments.
Asymmetric information is the second reason why contracts are incomplete.  A contract is 
incomplete owing to such endogenous factors when one of the parties cannot observe key
economic variables either at the time of contracting or upon renegotiation, or because they cannot
verify those variables to courts, or because they choose for strategic reasons not to disclose
private information about themselves.  When these conditions obtain, parties will choose to write26
incomplete contracts even if transactions costs are zero.  The possibility that contracts are
incomplete because of endogenous factors urges even greater modesty about the state’s role in
creating useful default rules.  The state is incapable of completing contracts with useful defaults
whenever contracts are endogenously incomplete.  A default would have to be conditioned on
information that is unobservable  to the parties and/or unverifiable to the courts.  Since
contracting parties will not condition their contracts on information that is unobservable or
unverifiable, they would opt out of any such state-supplied defaults.  Put another way, the state
cannot write better contracts than the parties can for themselves in a world of zero transactions
costs.  Under these conditions the state simply cannot provide parties with useful defaults that
solve their contracting problems.27
This analysis suggests that the role courts may have traditionally assumed in specifying 
default rules for contracting parties may be far less useful in a complex economy, unless the
courts have the capacity to craft tailored defaults by efficiently incorporating commercial
practice and experience for commercial subgroups.  Moreover, the invitation to courts to seek to
18
advance the standardization goal by creating broadly useful defaults threatens the parallel goal of
predictable interpretation, especially when incompleteness is a product of asymmetric information. 
 Thus, for example, parties may write incomplete contracts that look to renegotiation as the
mechanism for achieving ex post efficiency.  Under these conditions, the verifiable price and
quantity terms in an otherwise incomplete contract may well be designed to form the basis for ex
post renegotiation.  A court that conditions the enforceability of the price and quantity terms of
the contract by completing the contract with a default rule is changing the agreed upon
parameters of the renegotiation game.
Does this mean that there is no role for state-facilitated standardization in a complex
environment of incomplete contracting?  The answer is certainly no.  A clue to the solution to the
vexing problem of regulating incomplete contracts lies in the fact that heterogeneity of both
contracting behavior and of contracting parties argues for preserving the objective instruments for
interpreting contracts.  Given the difficulty of identifying whether incompleteness is a
consequence of high transactions costs or of asymmetric information, and assuming that the state
cannot efficiently incorporate the  commercial norms necessary to supply useful tailored defaults,
the best option is for courts to interpret the verifiable terms of the contract without recourse to
extrinsic evidence.  Thus, a given form of words will come to have a given meaning that will hold
across cases.  Not only would this goal preserve the uniformity value of predictable interpretation,
but, insofar as courts authoritatively interpret commonly used express terms, it advances the
standardization norm by expanding the menu of express invocations and conventions.
In sum, the maximizing solution to the regulation of incomplete contracts suggested by
this analysis is for the state to embrace the single-minded institutional goal of motivating
improvements in the express invocations and conventions that constitute the defining instruments
parties use in writing contracts.  A rigorous application of the plain meaning rule will reduce
interpretation error by encouraging more careful choices of clear standardized signals.  Over time,
a menu of these express invocations and conventions will be developed by private parties,
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authoritatively interpreted by the courts, and thereby standardized for widespread adoption by
other parties with similar contracting problems.
The cost of this institutional design is the inability of courts, barred from evaluating the
commercial context, to incorporate the customary prototypes that typify a particular commercial
context and that might otherwise emerge as tailored defaults.  The merits of the strategy thus turn
on a straightforward empirical question.  To what extent does ( or can) efficient incorporation
occur?  In the absence of efficient incorporation, a strategy of plain meaning interpretation would
maximize the interpretation and standardization values inherent in the uniformity norm.  Evidence
of incorporation of commercial norms by courts under the Code would thus suggest that the
theoretical skepticism about judicial creation of useful defaults may be unwarranted.  On the other
hand, evidence that courts under the Code do not (or can not) use the incorporation mechanism to
create tailored defaults would lend credence to the more modest role suggested by the recent
theoretical literature.
 See e.g., Henrietta Mills Inc. v. Commissioner, 52 F.2d 931,934 (4th Circ. 1931) (“the courts will not write28
contracts for the parties to them nor construe them other than in accordance with the plain and literal meaning of the
language used.”); See also, Farnsworth, Disputes over Omission in Contracts, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 860, 862-64 (1968).
 See e.g., Smith v. Abel, 316 P.d. 146,148 (Ore. 1957) (“While custom, if sufficiently shown, might be used29
to interpret an ambiguous term in the contract, it could not be used to make a contract or to add to or contradict the terms
of the contract.”); Swiss Credit Bank v. Board of Trade, 597 F2d. 146, 148 (9th Cir. 1979) (ambiguity is necessary to
admission of usage evidence).  
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II.   EVALUATING SUBSTANTIVE UNIFORMITY  UNDER THE CODE AND  
COMMON LAW
The question of whether the Code or the common law best achieves the efficiency goals
that inhere in uniformity is amenable to observation since we now have thirty years experience
with sales law under the Code against which we can compare a roughly parallel experience with
the common law regulation of commercial services contracts.  The state plays a relatively
restrained role in supplying standardized defaults under the traditional common law approach to
interpretation and incorporation.  The common law interpretive approach, as reflected in the parol
evidence and plain meaning rules, focuses intensively on the written agreement.   If the writing28
appears to be a complete expression of the parties’ agreement, the common law parol evidence
rule bars introduction of contextual evidence to contradict or even supplement the written terms.  29
Only the established set of judicially or legislatively recognized default rules (the law of contract)
are automatically incorporated into the agreement.  In addition, the traditional plain meaning rule
bars parties from using contextual evidence to aid in the  interpretation of contract terms that
appear clear and unambiguous on their face, giving instead a lay or “dictionary” meaning to the
words used.
Quite clearly, the traditional common law approach to interpretation and incorporation
resolves the uniformity dilemma by sacrificing the possible benefits from increasing the supply of
standardized defaults in order to preserve the benefits from predictable, “objective” interpretation. 
But what if the incorporation process could be deployed efficiently to discover and then
promulgate as tailored defaults, experiences and practices derived from the general commercial
Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the Justice Paradox, 35 W & M L. Rev. 329, 341 (1993); Richard Danzig,30
A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 621 (1975).
UCC Section 2-202, comment 1: “This section definitely rejects ...any premise that the language used has the31
meaning attributable to such language by rules of construction existing in the law rather than the meaning which arises
out of the commercial context in which it was used. “ See also, UCC Section 1-205, comment 1: “This Act rejects both
the “lay dictionary” and the “conveyancers” reading of a commercial agreement.”
UCC section 2-202 and  comments 1, 2 (1994). “[W]ritings are to be read on the assumption that the course32
of prior dealings between the parties and the usages of trade were taken for granted when the document was phrased.”
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environment?  Such useful defaults might include trade usages regarding the existence of
warranties, commonly accepted quality tolerances, and circumstances under which price and
quantity terms that appear to be fixed are in fact subject to some variation.  These customary
norms can serve as prototypes; as temporal precursors to formal legal recognition.  If
incorporation could be efficiently deployed in that manner, it would argue for a more balanced
approach to maximizing substantive uniformity-- trading off some of the gains from plain meaning
interpretation so as to facilitate incorporation of useful defaults for commercial subgroups. 
It is precisely that intuition that appears to undergird Llewellyn’s notion of “immanent”
law.  Llewellyn saw the law as the crystallization of slowly evolving social mores.  A just law was
inherent in the patterns of relationships that one could observe and record in the commercial
environment.  From this perspective, the role of courts was not deductive, but inductive: to
observe and record what was already there.   Thus the Code, buttressed by Llewellyn’s30
jurisprudential intuitions, purports to offer a dramatically different, activist  approach to the
uniformity dilemma.    The Code purports to reverse the common law presumption that the parties
writings and the official majoritarian default rules (the law of contract) are the definitive elements
of the agreement.  Rather the Code explicitly invites incorporation by defining the content of an
agreement to include trade usage, prior dealings and the parties experiences in performing the
contract.  Indeed, the Code rejects the plain meaning rule,  and its parol evidence rule admits31
inferences from usage, prior dealings and contractual performance even if the express terms of the
contract seem perfectly clear and are apparently integrated.32
 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, sections 204, 221, 222, 223 (1979).33
  See e.g., Publicker Indus., Inc. V. Union Carbide Corp., 17 UCC Rep. Serv. 989 (Pa. 1975); Missouri Pub.34
Serv. Co. v. Peobody Coal Co., 583 S.W. 2d 721 (Mo. 1979).
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Following the adoption of the Code, a number of common law courts (encouraged
perhaps by the  Second Restatement of Contracts ) have recognized informal commercial33
practices in the course of interpreting commercial services contracts.  But the tide of expansive
incorporation has not swept away the restrained approach of the common law tradition.  Thus, the
two systems continue in an uneasy coexistence and provide a unique opportunity to observe how
different methods of institutional design influence the social benefits  that inhere in uniformity.
Substantive Uniformity Under the Code
In this section, I evaluate the extent to which courts, adjudicating disputed sales contracts
under the Code, have been successful in implementing the approach that Llewellyn seems to have
envisaged: balancing the predictability (and standardization) benefits of uniform interpretation
against the standardization benefits from activist incorporation.
The Increase in Interpretation Bias.  The  activist approach to incorporation adopted by
the Code necessarily increases the stress on courts seeking to minimize errors in interpretation. 
Parties must communicate the express terms of their agreement through the inherently imperfect
mediation of words, actions and other manifestations that admit of varying interpretations.  As the
arbiter of disputed interpretations, the state determines the meaning of whatever signals the
parties exchange.  While the state presumably knows what it means by the default rules that it
implies in every contract, it does not know the intended meaning of the express terms chosen by
the parties.  Thus, privately formulated express terms are always subject to an additional risk of
unpredictable (or nonuniform) interpretation.  Contracting parties face an inherent risk that an
express term that was designed to trump the default terms of the contract will be interpreted
instead as merely supplementing the default understanding.  34
See e.g., Brunswick Box Co. v. Coutinho, Caro & Co., 617 F2d. 355 (4th Cir. 1980); Steuber C. v. Hercules,35
Inc. 646 F2d. 1093 (5th Cir. 1981); Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F2d. 772 (9th Cir. 1981);
Columbia Nitrogen  Corp. v. Royster., 451 F2d. 3 (4th Cir. 1971); Modine Mfg. Co. v. North E. Independent School
Dist., 503 S.W. d. 833 ( Tex. Civ. 
App. 1975).
UCC Sec. 1-205 (4) (1978).36
This interpretive error is both “unpredicted” and also “unpredictable”.  Courts sometimes commit the reverse37
error of interpreting express terms that seem intended by the parties as merely supplementary to the default assumptions
as trumping those assumptions.  Thus, the bias is both skewed in favor of the standard norms and uncertain in its
application to particular cases.  See (cite cases).
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  Casual observation strongly suggests that the risk of unpredictable interpretation has
greatly increased for commercial parties under the Code.  Courts under the Code have, consistent
with its institutional design, interpreted the meaning of express terms in a contract by looking to
precisely the same commercial and legal context they use to determine whether to incorporate
custom and usage as default rules.   Giving the commercial context interpretive priority over the35
verifiable express terms in the contract subverts the efforts of parties to opt out of ill-fitting
defaults.  Thus, for example, the Code directs courts to construe express terms and the
commercial context as consistent with each other.   While this presumption is limited by the 36
corollary that inconsistent usages and experiences should give way, courts have frequently
abandoned this principle on the grounds that there is almost always some contextual argument
upon which seemingly inconsistent terms can be rationalized.  In practice, therefore, the
presumption of consistency in the Code has placed a considerable additional burden on parties
seeking to opt out of either the legally-supplied defaults or the commercial context.37
The effects of interpretation bias under the Code are not limited to the error costs of
unpredictable interpretation.  A contextualized strategy of interpretation also undermines the
ability of courts to increase over time the supply of officially recognized (and standardized)
invocations and other express conventions.  The abandonment by the Code of the plain meaning
rule has resulted in decisions that strip terms of their meanings and thus erode the established
menu of standardized express terms.
Brunswick Box Co. v. Coutinho, Caro & Co., 617 F. d. 355 (4th Cir. 1980).38
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In one illustrative case, the seller attempted to introduce evidence of a course of
performance between the parties to suggest that the buyer had agreed to pay for unloading and
storage charges.   The court admitted the evidence despite the presence in the contract of an38
F.A.S. shipment term that, in standard meaning, requires the seller to pay for unloading and
storage charges.  The court apparently believed that it was incorporating the course of
performance as a tailored default to redesign the somewhat ill-fitting conventional meaning
attached to F.A.S by the Code.  However, this legal recognition of a prevailing contextual pattern
threatens the parallel process by which courts recognize (and standardize) similarly useful express
signals of agreement.  In order to protect standardized express terms from interpretive bias, the
course of performance must be seen as trumped by the talismanic meaning attributed to the F.A.S
term.  After all, if parties are to use express invocations and conventions to trump default rules,
the language they use for this purpose must be insulated from the context they are seeking to
escape.   On this view, an express invocation or convention selected by the parties can only be
modified by additional express language.   Otherwise, incorporation of the factual context will
create a presumptive answer to the very question being asked.
The Results of  the Incorporation Strategy.  The increase in interpretation bias reflected in
decisions by courts under the Code is predicted by the analysis developed earlier in Part I.  The
central question remains: is the reduction in the benefits from predictable  interpretation and the
resulting reduction in the supply of standardized express terms justified by the offsetting gains
resulting from the incorporation of useful defaults from the commercial context?
While the Code was explicitly designed to incorporate evolving norms into an ever
growing set of legally defined default rules, incorporation as such has simply not occurred.  To be
sure, courts have interpreted disputed contracts in which context evidence has been evaluated
together with the written terms of the contract.  The invitation to contextualize the contract in this
UCC section 1-102(3) defines “ agreement” as “the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or39
by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as
provided in this Act.”
 UCC section 1-205(3) (1994) Comment 1 to section 1-205 provides that:40
This act rejects both the “lay-dictionary” and the “conveyancer’s” reading of a commercial agreement.
Instead the meaning of the agreement is to be determined by the language used by them and by their
action, read and interpreted in the light of commercial practices and other surrounding circumstances. 
The measure and background for interpretation are set by the commercial context, which may explain
and supplement even the language of a formal or final writing.
 The norm of commercial reasonableness is variously expressed in Article 2, sometimes just with the41
injunction “reasonable”, but always directed to or qualified (usually explicitly) by a broader reference to commercial
practice.  See e.g., sections 2-103(1)(b), 2-204, 2-205, 2-206, 2-208, 2-305, 2-308, 2-309, 2-311, 2-402, 2-503, 2-510,
2-513, 2-603, 2-604, 2-605, 2-607, 2-608, 2-609, 2-610, 2-614, 2-706, 2-709, 2-710, 2-712, 2-714.
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manner  is explicitly embodied in the Code’s definition of “agreement”,  and it is amplified by39
section 1-205(3), which specifies that courses of dealing and usages of trade give particular
meaning to, and qualify terms of, an agreement.   But while judicial decisions affirm the40
institutional bias toward contextualizing the contract, the fact-specific nature of the contract
dispute leaves, in virtually every case, little opportunity for subsequent incorporation as tailored
defaults.  
The limited role played by usage and course of dealings per se is not surprising. These
disputes always arise as interpretive disputes over the meaning of express terms and particular
usages and not as the means of specifying a more precise or tailored meaning of the substantive
obligations embodied in the Code’s numerous default rules .   The vehicle for this latter aspect of
the incorporation project, in Llewellyn’s mind, was the pervasive direction to courts (found  in a
majority of the specific provisions of Article 2) to apply the default provision in question
according to  the norm of commercial reasonableness.   41
The supereminent norm of commercial reasonableness was seen by Llewellyn as a key
incorporating mechanism; one that would function as an empirical direction.  To decide if the
parties have acted in a commercially reasonable manner as to any particular contractual obligation,
the court is asked to look to the commercial environment and observe the relevant commercial
 A. Schwartz & R. Scott, Commercial Transactions: Principles and Policies 5 (1981).42
 UCC section 2-609 (1994).43
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behavior.  Once revealed (and mediated through the normative “purposes” of the Code), this
standard would then provide the legal norm to be published as an appropriately tailored  default
for the relevant class of contracting parties.   42
Thus, for example, section 2-609 provides that “when reasonable grounds for insecurity
arise with respect to the performance of either party the other may in writing demand adequate
assurances of due performance and until he receives such assurances may if commercially
reasonable suspend his own performance...”   Generations of law students have begun their study43
of the Code by confronting the facially vacuous nature of that default provision.  As a majoritarian
default, it offers little in the way of a standardized contractual risk assignment since it carries no
predictable meaning.  But Llewellyn understood this point as well.  Section 2-609 was never
intended to operate as a useful default on its face.  Rather, the key instructions-- “adequate
assurances”, “reasonable grounds for insecurity” and “commercially reasonable” suspension--
were intended to direct courts to examine the relevant contracting environment and then
(presumably over time) publish meaningfully tailored defaults that would apply to particular
populations of commercial parties. 
 This was a revolutionary idea, and one that seemed to anticipate the theoretical objection
to state-supplied default rules raised by the recent literature on incomplete contracting.  But the
project has failed in implementation.  Systematic examination of the litigated cases interpreting the
Code’s “reasonableness” standards reveals that courts have consistently interpreted these
statutory instructions not as inductive directions to incorporate commercial norms and prototypes
but rather as invitations to make deductive speculations according to “Code policy” or other non-
 A LEXIS search for cases of the past ten years which invoke commercial reasonableness in close conjunction44
with mention of at least one Article two section returned one-hundred and sixty-four hits.  A detailed examination of
fifty-five cases randomly selected from the this base pool revealed two cases where the court viewed the commercial
reasonableness question as requiring inductive evaluation.  See Havird Oil Co. V. Marathon Oil Co., 149 F.3d 283 (4th
1998); Cattle Fin. Co. v. Boedery, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 362 (D. Kan. 1992). In eighteen other cases a deductive approach
was used in the evaluation of commercial reasonableness.  See Meyer v. Norwest Bank Iowa, 112 F.3d 946 (8th 1997);
U&W Indus. Supply v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 34 F.3d 180 (3d 1994); Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Bressler, (2d
1992); Bill’s Coal Co. v. Board of Pub. Utils. Of Springfield, 887 F.2d 242 (10th 1989); Canusa Corp. v. A&R
Lobosco, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 723 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Spanierman Gallery Profit Sharing Plan v. Arnold, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3547 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 1997); Waldorf Steel Fabricators v. Consolidated Sys., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12340
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1996); Wayman v. Amoco Oil Co., 923 F. Supp. 1322 (D. Kan. 1996); RW Power Ptnrs., L.P. v.
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 899 F. Supp. 1490 (E.D. Va. 1995); Twin Creeks Entertainment, Inc. v. U.S. JVC Corp.,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2413 (N.D. Ca. Feb. 22, 1995); BAII Banking Corp. v. ARCO, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14107
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1993); J. Moreria, LDA. v. Rio Rio, Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19088 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1992);
Larsen Leasing v. Thiele, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Mich. 1990); Danish Fur Breeders Assn. v. Olga Furs, Inc.,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4779 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1990); In re Narragansett Clothing Co., 138 B.R. 354 (Bankr. D.R.I.
1992); Bockman Printing & Servs. v. Baldwin-Gregg, Inc., 572 N.E.2d 1094 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Touch of Class
Leasing v. Mercedes-Benz Credit of Canada, Inc., 591 A.2d 661 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Hornell Brewing Co.
v. Spry, 664 N.Y.S.2d 698 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).  Of the remaining thirty-five cases, nineteen touched only tangentially
upon the issue of commercial reasonableness, while sixteen dealt principally with commercial reasonableness under
other sections of the Code or other areas of the law, e.g., Articles 2A, 3, 9 and common law real property.  See also Imad
D. Abyad, Note, Commercial Reasonableness in Karl Llewellyn’s Uniform Commercial Code Jurisprudence, 83 Va.
L. Rev. 429 (1997), for a systematic review of the interpretation and use by courts of the supereminent notion of
commercial reasonableness under the Code.  Abyad finds that courts predominantly apply a deductive approach to the
determination of commercial reasonableness. But he also notes and examines some striking exceptions to this general
rule in courts’ treatment of certain provisions within Articles 3 and 9 of the Code.
 It is a separate and independent question  whether, had the results of the Code’s experiment with45
incorporation been different, the tailored defaults that were announced and standardized would have been either optimal
or efficiently promulgated by courts.  See Jody Kraus,  Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J.
Legal Stud. 377 (1997) (arguing that evolutionary norms are not likely to be optimal and suggesting the continuing
utility of intelligent institutional design).   See also Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for
Commercial Contracts, 19 J Legal Stud. 597 (1990) (suggesting that  a positive explanation for the absence of tailored
defaults lies in the parties’ preferences to be governed under separate regimes of bright-line majoritarian default rules
and flexible extralegal norms that are not legally enforceable.  “It may be that the great lesson for the courts is that any
effort to judicialize these social rules will destroy the very informality that make them so effective in the first instance”. 
Id at 615); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business
Norms, 144 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1765 (1996) (same). 
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contextual criteria.   I evaluate the reasons for the failure of the Code’s incorporation strategy in44
Part III.  But the empirical point is that, for whatever reason, courts charged with the
responsibility of implementing the Code’s activist policy towards incorporation have declined to
do so.   45
Thus, the costs of a strategy of incorporation-- a highly contextualized interpretive
See, e.g., Watkins v. Pedro Search, Inc., 689 F. d. 537 (1982) (unambiguous writing will be accorded the46
meaning apparent on its face; objective and not subjective intent controls); Mellon Bank v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc,
619 F. d. 1001 (3d Cir. 1980) (same);  Lee v. Flintkote Co., 593 F. 2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (plain meaning rule bars
evidence of meaning of unequivocal contract terms);  Reed, Wible & Brown, Inc. v. Mahogany Run Dev. Co., 550 F.
Supp. 1095 (M.D. La. 1982) (same);  Acree v. Shell Oil Co., 721 F. d. 524 (5th. Cir. 1983); William B. Tanner Co. v.
Sparta-tomah Broadcasting Co., 543 F. Supp. 593 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (unambiguous contract language should be given
its plain meaning, with no need to consider extrinsic evidence or rules of construction); Berry v. Klinger, 225 Va. 201
(1983) (plain meaning rule controls interpretation of unambiguous written contract) (same result in New York, North
Carolina, Illinois, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania, see cases cited in Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice, 73
Calif. L. Rev. at n. 124)
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methodology that seeks to embed the explicit terms of a contract within a larger commercial
context-- seem not to be justified by corresponding enhancements in the supply of useful defaults
for appropriate subsets of commercial contractors.  At least according to the uniformity criteria
developed above, the results of thirty of codified uniformity suggest that formal uniformity has
masked a general deterioration in the efficiency values that stimulated the search for a uniform law
in the first instance.  The final question, of course, is whether the parallel experience of courts
regulating incomplete commercial services contracts under the common law has been more or less
“uniform” than the results under the Code.
Substantive Uniformity under the Modern Common Law
It is striking to contrast the experiment in codified uniformity with the experience of
common law enforcement of commercial services contracts over the same forty year period.  The
interpretive methodology of the common law has stubbornly resisted the contextual interpretation
adopted by the Code and the Second Restatement of Contracts.  The overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions continue to adhere to textualist interpretation of contract terms, primarily through a
rigorous adherence to the plain meaning rule.  Indeed, the continuing vitality of the traditional
parol evidence and plain meaning rules cannot be overestimated.   In numerous cases, common46
law courts interpreting commercial contracts have been unwilling to accept the implications of
contextualization; in one guise or another they continue to invoke the primacy of express,
verifiable contract terms and of the written agreement between the parties.
 See Goetz & Scott, Expanded Choice, supra note --- at ---.  See also, Eric Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule,47
The Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 533 (1998).
Apt examples of standardized invocations are “Incoterms”, the international rules for the interpretation of48
trade terms.  See International Commerce Comm’n, Incoterms (1980).  Each of the fourteen Incoterms attempts to set
forth a number of substantive rules.  These rules were well-known and widely used terms of international trade before
their formal codification by the International Chamber of Commerce.  Examples of conventions include corporate
indentures, bond covenants and most of the standard features of corporate financial agreements. See generally, Marcel
Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (OR “The Economics of
Boilerplate:), 83 Va. L. Rev. 713 (1997)
29
  Two uniformity values are served by the common law courts’ insistence on preserving
the traditional approach to contractual interpretation.  First, a rigorous application of the plain
meaning rule reduces the errors caused by unpredictable interpretations of incomplete contracts
by encouraging parties to use clearer, pre-defined signals of the reasons for contractual
incompleteness.  Second, plain meaning interpretation facilitates that portion of the
standardization function that derives from the recognition of customary express terms.  These
terms then carry a standard meaning whenever they are used, even if their use is not so customary
as to warrant automatic incorporation as default rules.   Over time, the legal recognition of47
certain talismanic words and phrases greatly facilitates the contracting process.  Definitional
recognition does not change the optional character of these terms, but it does confer upon them
the status of invocations or conventions so that, once expressly incorporated into a contract, they 
will have a legally circumscribed meaning that will be heavily and perhaps even irrebuttably
presumed. 
As one might predict, a study of the  evolving  common law of commercial services
contracts does not reveal the incorporation by courts of novel default rules.  Incorporation is
stymied by an interpretive methodology that systematically excludes reference to the commercial
context.  But the past forty years has nonetheless seen a remarkable harmonization in standardized
terms through the development of a rich menu of express invocations and conventions.  48
Standardization of express terms has been stimulated in construction contracting, for example,
through the offices of key intermediaries such as the American Institute of Architects.  These and
 See. e.g., the responses of both the American Institute of Architects and the Associated General Contractors49
to the need to develop uniform  rules governing fast track construction management contracting.  American Inst. of
Architects, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, Docs. Nos. A101/CM, A201/CM, B141/CM,
B801(1980); Associated Gen Contractors, Standard Form of Agreement between Owner and Construction Manager,
Doc. No. 8a (1977), 8d (19790, 8 (1980). 
 Bernstein, supra note --- at ---.50
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other trade organizations have developed and promulgated model contract terms and forms which
are widely and successfully used by parties to construction contracts and which have been subject
to remarkably uniform interpretation by state courts.  These model or standard forms provide a
mechanism for internalizing at least some of the benefits from contractual innovation and
standardization that private parties are otherwise unable to capture.  In instances where the trade
organization represents a significant subset of the potential users of the standard terms, it can
supply the coordination necessary to overcome the collective action problems discussed earlier. 
 Industry codes have also played a significant role in the development of novel uniform
terms to respond to changing conditions within certain markets.   Perhaps surprisingly, the49
maintenance of rigorous rules of objective interpretation seems to have stimulated the
development of novel standard terms by trade groups and other intermediaries.  These kinds of
standardized options have been far slower to develop under the Code.  Indeed, Lisa Bernstein
notes the phenomenon of a key commercial subgroup under the Code--The National Grain and
Feed Association-- choosing to opt out of the Code entirely in order to secure the kind of plain
meaning interpretations necessary to the promulgation of standardized  norms.   50
Thus, the common law regulation of commercial contracts seems to have created a
hospitable legal environment, one  that facilitates the development of intermediaries to overcome
the collective action problems that otherwise retard the development of novel uniform terms. 
Moreover, additional harmonization of non-code commercial law has resulted from the
jurisdictional diversity that the Code drafters sought so vigorously to overcome.   New York, for
example has solidified its position as the jurisdiction of choice for commercial contractors by
 find cite51
 See generally, Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev.52
758 (1995).
 Karl Llewellyn (get cite: Florida or Florida State Law Review, late 1950's)53
Arthur Rosett, Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification, and Reform in International54
Commercial Law, 40 Am. J. Comp. L. 683 (1992).
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enacting a choice of law selection statute that permits parties ex ante to choose  New York
contract law as the uniform source of interpretation.  51
In addition to the temporal benefits from uniformity, there are efficiency gains that inhere
in jurisdictional uniformity.  Prime among these are “learning effects” that result from a common
legal language and method of categorization of legal rules.   Here the formal uniformity of the52
Code might seem to offer a significant advantage over the common law.  Indeed,  the notion of a
uniform “filing system” that permits the storage and retrieval of key legal information remains one
of the strongest justifications offered by Karl Llewellyn for a uniform sales law.   Under the53
Code’s cataloguing system, specific court decisions are filed under the broad rubrics of Code-
defined categories such as rejection, cure, etc.  Systematizing the retrieval of legal rules reduces
the learning effects imposed by jurisdictional diversity.  Presumably, information costs would be
greater if the decisions were not organized in a systematic way. 
Despite the jurisdictional diversity that remains under the common law, there is reason to
believe that learning effects and legal information costs are not significantly greater than under the
Code.  Economic and cultural forces may well have contributed to the evolution of
interjurisdictional substantive uniformity during this same period.  Indeed, the past forty years
have witnessed a remarkable degree of harmonization of American commercial common law.  The
variations in contract law from state to state today are relatively small and insignificant.  There are
few instances where a state persists over time in applying a widely variant “rule”of contract law. 
The result is “substantive harmony without uniformity.”   54
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This result should not be surprising.  Powerful market forces push toward harmonization
across jurisdictions.  Judges, especially in commercial cases, want to please the practicing bar;
they benefit from favorable evaluations of their work from insiders.  The practicing bar,
meanwhile, prefers law that is (1) predictable, so that they are  better able to advise their clients,
and (2) substantively right, insofar as there is a substantively right answer.  Quite obviously, these
two factors coalesce.  Where the law is uncertain, but there is a strong substantive case for one
legal rule rather than another, the practicing bar would like to be able to predict the outcome by
discerning the substantively better rule.  Thus, both factors push toward harmonization, probably
with a tendency to follow those state courts with special expertise and prestige.  In short, while
the risks of casual empiricism argue for tentativeness in advancing empirical claims, nevertheless
all the available evidence points to the fact that the Uniform Commercial Code has been far less
successful than the common law alternative in promoting the efficiency values of uniformity.
 See Note, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn’s German Sources for the Uniform55
Commercial Code, 97 Yale L. J. 156 (1987).
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III.  NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS: THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF  THE 
FAILURE OF CODIFIED UNIFORMITY   
Why has the experiment with codified uniformity performed so poorly in terms of the
substantive objectives of a uniform law?  And what are the effects of that failure?  In this Part, I
explore both of these questions.
Why the Uniform Code has Failed to Produce Substantive Uniformity
 The are doubtless many  reasons for the failure of the Code to achieve the objectives of
its drafters.  Quite clearly, one central reason was the failure of the other Code drafters to adopt
Llewellyn’s proposal that commercial disputes under the Code be resolved by merchant juries.
Llewellyn believed that a major purpose of the Code was to resolve disputes according the ‘best’
commercial norms.  In his view, the task of the courts was to identify and select the best
commercial prototypes that were revealed in a particular commercial environment.  One obvious
objection to this strategy, of course, is that courts lack the expertise to observe and evaluate
merchant practice.  To respond to this concern, Llewellyn designed the supereminent norm of
commercial reasonableness as an empirical direction:  to delegate discretion to expert bodies, not
judges and lay jurors.   Eliminating the merchant jury while retaining the pervasive notion of55
commercial reasonableness was, in consequence, a drafting disaster.  
But the failure to provide for the merchant jury is but a symptom of a larger jurisprudential
mistake for which Llewellyn must be held at least partly responsible.  Llewellyn believed that
moral norms can be derived from actual practices.  But how is this to be accomplished?  After all, 
the evaluator must have some moral criteria, derived independently from the practice, in order to
 To do otherwise requires overcoming a naturalistic gap.  It risks committing what arguably is the naturalistic56
fallacy.  See G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica 10-14 (1971 ed.).  For a recent assessment which doubts the existence of the
fallacy, see Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard & Peter Railton, Toward Fin de Siecle Ethics: Some Trends, 101 Phil. Rev.
115, 115-120 (1992).
 UCC section 2-103(1)(b) provides that “‘good faith’ in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the57
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”
 See Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition (1960).58
 See discussion supra at---.59
 The decision to create a true code was combined with the political instincts not to publicize the project as a60
codification.  William Hawkland, who served as Llewellyn’s research assistant, suggests that if Llewellyn had publicized
his intention to codify the commercial law, the UCC would “probably have died aborning”.  William Hawkland, The
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extract the “ought” from the “is”.  For example, assume a court is faced with the question of56
good faith in the case of a merchant under section 2-103(1)(b).   The subject of the dispute is the57
merchant’s business practice which is followed by some, but not all, of the participants in the
trade.  Whether this practice reflects “the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade” cannot be answered by the mere existence of the practice.  The court must,
therefore, have some criteria , derived independently from the practice, by which to decide
whether the practice is “ reasonable” and “fair” under the legal standard.
It seems quite clear that this point was not lost on Llewellyn either.  He had an answer: the
moral norms used to sort good practices from bad ones were to come from the purposes of the 
Code itself.  Llewellyn, like most realists, wanted courts to choose purpose over rule language: to
do this is to judge in the “grand style”.   Thus, Llewellyn wanted particular Code sections58
interpreted in light of the purposes underlying the Code itself.  This preference explains, in part,
the decision to retain the supereminent norm of reasonableness even after the proposal for
merchant juries was abandoned.  Llewellyn wanted courts to understand that it was desirable to
decide specific cases in light of the Code’s general purposes.  To do that, he joined,
enthusiastically, those of his colleagues who were promoting (for instrumental reasons)  the idea59
of a “true commercial code” to replace the checkered pastiche of prior uniform statutes.  Thus,
instrumental and jurisprudential considerations were united. 60
Uniform Commercial Code and the Civil Codes, 56 La. L. Rev. 231, 233 (1995).  But, nevertheless, a code by any other
name......
 One can debate the point of whether or not the Code is a “true code”.  There is respectable academic61
argument either way.  On the side of the “true code” advocates can be placed the strong set of normative principles to
guide in Code interpretation that section 1-102 provides, the uniform jurisprudential underpinnings generated by
systematic recourse to commercial context, and the pervasive reliance on “reasonableness and other supereminent
norms.  See e.g. Richard Buxbaum, Is the Uniform Commercial Code a Code?, Rechtsrealismus, multikulturelle
Gesellschaft und Handelsrecht, 197, 220 (Duncker & Humbolt, Berlin 1994). (arguing that the UCC is a code “within
the American frame of reference”); William Hawkland, Uniform Commercial “Code Methodology, 1962 U. Ill. L.F. 291
(1962) (same).  On the other side, one can invoke section 1-103 which purports to make the UCC dependent on extra-
UCC law. See Homer Kripke, 1962 U. Ill. L.F. ---(1962). 
But section 1-103 is a slim reed on which to hang the argument that the Code is not a “code”. The provision
does not operate as a dynamic incorporation mechanism. Recourse to the law merchant and to the “law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or
other validating or invalidating cause” is only appropriate “unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act”. 
Section 1-102, which  specifies liberal construction to promote the underlying policies of  clarification, expansion of
commercial practices and uniformity, is precisely the sort of  “particular provision” which displaces the common law. 
Thus, the primary effect of section 1-103 is to incorporate non- controversial default rules and subject them to the very
same interpretive methodology  that influences the interpretation of the Code-supplied defaults.  In the sense that it
matters here, therefore, the Code is a “true” Code in that it has a self-contained mechanism for interpretation and
expansion of internally generated rules and principles of interpretation.
 Hawkland, note --- supra at 235 et seq.; William D. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial “Code” Methodology,62
1962 U. Ill. L.F. 291 (1962).
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 The decision to create a true code was a fateful one.   A central difference between the61
uniform commercial statues that preceded the UCC and the new Code lay in the different
interpretive methodologies that are dictated by a code.  A code is a preemptive, systematic and
comprehensive enactment of a whole field of law.   It presumes to carry within it the answers to62
all possible questions.  Thus, when a court confronts a gap in an incomplete contract, its duty in
interpreting a code is to find by extrapolation and analogy a solution consistent with the purposes
and policy of the codifying law.  A code remains at all times its own best evidence of what it
means.  Thus, the decisions interpreting provisions of a code do not as easily become part of the
understood meaning of its terms as they do in the case of an ordinary statutory enactment.  
In order to accomplish its purposes, a code must have a systematic method of filling gaps
by a self-referential process of divining the purposes of the enactment. In the UCC, this directive
is found in section 1-102 which directs courts to liberally construe and apply the specific
  UCC Section 1-102 (1994).  One of the profound ironies of the Code is that among the enumerated purposes63
of section 1-102 is to “make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions”.  The very provision that led to this
purpose being fulfilled in a formal sense create the seeds for failure in a substantive sense.
 Mitchell Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 330,64
333 (1951).  This claim seems confirmed by Comment I to section 1-102:  “This Act is drawn to provide flexibility...to
make it possible for the law embodied in this Act to be developed by the courts in the light of unforseen and new
circumstances and practices.”
 Hawkland, supra at -----.65
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provisions of the act “to promote is underlying purposes and policies.”   The effect of this63
language is that the Code not only has the force of law, but it is itself a source of law.   In64
important respects, therefore, Llewellyn’s Code displaced the legal method of the common law
and substituted the legal method of the civil law. 
  To construct the Code in the tradition of continental codifications required the
development of supereminent ‘safety valve” provisions designed to fill gaps and to mitigate the
harshness of bright line rules that would otherwise be asked to govern “hard” cases.   Gaps are to65
be filled through recourse to the purposes enumerated in the Code and, in specific provisions, by
recourse to the overarching injunction to follow the norms of “reasonableness”.  The net effect of
this institutional design is a highly contextualized interpretive methodology, one that seeks to
embed the explicit terms of a contract within the larger jurisprudential context of the Code as well
as within the specific commercial context being regulated.
The result, in terms of maximizing the benefits of substantive uniformity, could hardly
have been much worse.  First, the rejection of the common law plain meaning and parol evidence
rules was an open invitation to courts to abandon any meaningful constraints on the interpretation
of language.  Over time, the uniformity value of predictable interpretation has been eroded.  
While courts under the Code are uniformly using the same interpretive rules, the results they reach
are anything but uniform.  Thus, the Code quite self-consciously has squandered whatever
efficiency gains are achievable through uniform, objective methods of contract interpretation. 
 See text supra at ---.  Recall that efficient standardization requires not only that the present stock of standard66
terms and default be preserved but that, as they become incrusted with rote usage over time and as new practices
develop that demand new legal arrangements, the standardization process evolves new forms and coordinates the move
to the novel terms.  See Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice, supra note --- at ---.
 Another virtue of the common law versus the Code, given these factors, is that litigation and legal argument67
is much less costly under the common law scheme.  For example, as between context-free arguments about what
“F.A.S.” ought to mean, and arguments about what the relevant commercial customs are, the former are significantly
cheaper than the latter. Moreover, litigating commercial reasonableness is costly in another way--there is a substantial
error cost, a risk that courts will not get the custom right.  Commercial arrangements, after all, are anchored in industries
with which courts may have little familiarity.
The combination of these costs quite probably impel some commercial actors to invest, not in producing
evidence and argument about new commercial customs for incorporation into the Code, but rather in avoiding the Code
altogether, by arbitration or choice-of-law agreements or by other, more informal, means.  In sum, perhaps the Code
doesn’t incorporate new defaults because the mechanism by which the defaults are produced is too costly and that cost
drives parties more to litigation avoidance than to law production.  See infra at----.
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Second, the standardization process has failed to evolve.  Recall that standardization comes in
two forms:  the promulgation of useful default rules by incorporating commercial practice into
commercial law and the official recognition and interpretation of customary terms in a menu of 
invocations and conventions.  Neither of these processes has occurred with the same vigor in the
Code as in the parallel common law process. 
 One reason for the unwillingness of the courts to embrace incorporation may be the lack
of information regarding the effects of novel, tailored defaults in different settings and among
heterogenous parties.  But another reason seems to be the peculiar distortions created by code
methodology: courts are required to create default rules with reference to the hermetic regulatory
framework of the Code itself.  The process of Code interpretation inevitably resists the dynamic
process inherent in standardization.   A comprehensive Code means that, for any given issue,66
courts will be driven to adopt a rule that will then be treated as, in effect, a part of the Code.
Parties under the Code are thereby pushed toward arguments that are based on one or another
“Code rule”.  Contracting out of the rule, in turn, is made difficult by the widespread
abandonment by the Code of the parol evidence and plain meaning rules. Thus, code methodology
tends to produce a static equilibrium that impedes the evolution and promulgation of novel default
rules and contract terms.    Under the common law, on the other hand, the parol evidence and67
 See Bernstein, supra note---.68
 Bernstein, supra note-- at--.  I advanced this explanation for the dichotomy between bright line default rules69
and flexible commercial practice in an earlier paper.  See Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules, supra note--- at
613-615.
38
plain meaning rules make it fairly easy for parties to generate new terms which can then acquire
standard interpretations.  Those sorts of legal rules are not so enveloping; they are significantly
easier to opt into or out of. 
The Effects of a ‘Nonuniform’ Uniform Code
 The promulgation of a uniform code that reduces rather than enhances the economic
benefits from uniformity has had several significant effects.  The first is the observed practice of
groups of commercial parties opting out of the Code entirely in important classes of cases.  Lisa
Bernstein notes an important illustration: the decision by the members of the National Grain and
Feed Association to opt out of the Code and create a private legal system to resolve contract
disputes among their members.   One of the principal reasons for the Association’s decision to68
abandon the Code was their desire to have written express terms subject to a formalist and
objective interpretive methodology and not to be trumped by relevant evidence of course of
dealing or usage of trade.  Bernstein suggests that the explanation for this practice lies in the
parties desire to separate the legal norms that govern their written agreements from the informal
social norms that govern their actions.   An alternative (and complementary) explanation,69
however, is that opting out of the Code permits the grain and feed merchants to secure the
economic benefits of uniformity by substituting a private common law process for the state-
subsidized mechanism under the Code.  
Whether the practice of opting out of the Code by homogeneous groups of commercial
parties reflects an underlying inefficiency in the law is, of course, an empirical question.  We
would have to know how widespread is the practice that Bernstein and others have observed
 There are other illustrations of commercial parties opting out of ill-fitting default rules by developing70
standard terms that create customized risk allocations.  Perhaps the best example is the common practice in the purchase
and sale of hard goods of contract terms that trump the Code’s warranty scheme for allocating quality risks as well as the
Code’s scheme for  stimulating optimal salvage decisions through the mechanism of rejection/ acceptance/ cure, etc.  In
the place of Code warranties and the rules for acceptance, rejection, cure and revocation,  parties who trade in hard
goods  substitute standardized “repair and replacement” clauses.  Such clauses purport to divide quality risks between
buyer and seller to displace the default rules governing revocation of acceptance and cure (and perhaps rejection as
well).  See A. Schwartz & R. Scott, Sales Law and the Contracting Process 204-209,308-309 (1991).  Unfortunately,
the standard repair and replacement clauses have been subject to widely disparate interpretations by courts, producing
exactly the kinds of jurisdictional uncertainty costs that the Code was designed to reduce.  Compare e.g., Myrtle Beach
Pipeline Corp. v. Emerson Electric Co., 843 F. Supp 1027 (D. S.C. 1993) with Earl M. Jorgensen Co. v. Mark
Construction, Inc., 540 P2d 978 (Haw. 1975) and  International Financial Services, Inc. v. Franz, 23 UCC Rep 2d 1078
(Minn. 1994) with Chattlos v. NCR, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1986).
 Fred H. Miller, Realism Not Idealism in Uniform Laws-Observations from the Revision of the UCC, 39 So.71
Tex. L. Rev. 707 (1998)
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before passing judgment on the Code’s inefficiency.   Nevertheless, the evidence is sufficiently70
striking to undermine the uncritical assumption of the academic and professional proponents of
the Code  that it serves efficiently its purported purposes.
The second effect of the stasis in the supply of Code defaults is even more dramatic.  The
principal source of novelty in the supply of Code default rules has been through the agonizing
process of Code revision by legal academics and practitioners under the auspices of the ALI and
NCCUSL.  Technological change and the need for new legal instruments to accommodate that
change has been one of the driving forces  behind the current revision of the UCC.  Electronic
funds transfers, for example, stimulated revisions in Articles 3 and 4.  Changing business practices
led to Article 2A and revisions in Articles 5, 6, 8 and 9.   Article 2, the provision most clearly71
designed by Llewellyn to evolve through dynamic renewal, has been in the process of being
revised for the past decade with no end in sight. 
 Relying on the private legislative process that produces Code revisions to provide a new
generation of useful default rules is worrisome on several grounds.  First, the process is slow,
cumbersome and costly.  To the extent that there is a lag in the evolution of new contractual
standards, parties with emerging needs face a difficult choice.  Either they can rely upon ill-fitting
 See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 59572
(1995); Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 Va. L. Rev. 783 (1994).  For applications of this analysis to
international law making, see Paul Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy,
17 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 681 (1997).  
 See Schwartz & Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, supra note-- at --.73
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rules and/or standard terms that secure less than maximum trading gains or they can incur the
costs of crafting new forms of agreement that are better adapted to the evolving conditions.  To
the extent that  Code methodology impedes the development of intermediaries to internalize some
of the costs of innovation, commercial parties are often left with the option of lobbying in the
revision process as the only viable response to the problem of lags.
Lobbying by interest groups of the private legislative bodies that revise the Code raises a
further set of concerns.  Recent work on the political economy of private law making bodies
suggests that the rules produced by these private legislative bodies are more driven by institutional
factors than by their social desirability.   There are good reasons to believe that private law72
making bodies such as the ALI and NCCUSL will have a strong status quo bias and will
sometimes be captured by powerful interests.  More importantly, the legal rules that are the
products of these private legislative processes will sometimes be characterized by vague and
imprecise rules not because those rules are optimal but because of a particular institutional
dynamic.
In the case of Article 2, this analysis predicts that, despite the economic advantages of a
return to the common law approach to uniformity, the revision to Article 2 will continue contain
the same methodological characteristics as its predecessor: many vague rules that invoke the
animating purposes of the Code coupled with open-ended, contextual modes of interpretation.
These rules will dominate, not because of their intrinsic virtues, but because they are proposed by
reformers (i.e., legal academics) who are unable to get clear, bright-line rules enacted and, since
the effects of sales law do not fall systematically on any interest group, there are insufficient
incentives for organized interest groups to lobby for bright-line rules in their favor.  73
 Richard E. Speidel, Contract Formation and Modification Under Revised Article 2, 35 Wm & Mary L. Rev.74
1305, 1311 (1994).
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These predictions seem to be confirmed in the work to date of the Article 2 Drafting
Committee.  According to the Reporter of the Drafting Committee, the Committee “has preserved
the original approach to contract formation and interpretation attributable to Karl Llewellyn. This
approach minimizes formality...[t]he emphasis is upon flexible standards, mutual conduct and the
intention of the parties.”   In all likelihood, therefore, the Revised Article 2 will not address the74
underlying causes of the failure to achieve substantive uniformity.  Even if most contracting
parties would benefit from an institutional design that promoted the objective interpretation of
express contract language and the recognition and promulgation of privately-developed standard
terms, there are good reasons to believe that the institutional dynamic of the law making process
will result in a recodification of the status quo.  Whether it is socially optimal or not, opting out of
the Code and into the common law may be the only recourse for cohesive, homogeneous
commercial groups.
